Bid Lock
Overview
Second-price sealed-bid auctions are intentionally designed to be implemented in highly adversarial settings, but this method is hardly recognized as a viable procedure due to the ineffectiveness of current safety precautions. Our proposed solution aims to revitalize the integrity of these auctions by creating a dependable system that remains unaffected by the presence of dishonest parties through implementing cryptography.
Community Benefit
The development of our system has revitalized the integrity of second-price sealed-bid auctions by creating a dependable system that remains unaffected by the presence of dishonest parties. Moreover, our solution requires only one party to remain honest throughout the auction to preserve a functional and dependable system.
Team Members
- Carlos Fonseca - cfonseca2018@fau.edu
- Alexander Berry - aberry2017@fau.edu
- Fallon Falcone - ffalcone2019@fau.edu
- Wyatt Roe - wroe2020@fau.edu
- Georges Borque - gbourque2015@fau.edu
Sponsor
Dr. Feng-Hao Liu